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I. Introduction 
 
In the spring of 2001, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) handed down 
judgment in Z and Others v. the United Kingdom.
1
  Z was a young child who, along with her four 
younger siblings, had been severely physically, mentally, and possibly sexually abused for over 
four years.
2
  In the original case before the House of Lords, Z had alleged that the public 
authorities had negligently fulfilled, or entirely failed to carry out, their duties to protect children 
from child abuse.
3
  Finding no statutory provision that allowed for damages, the House of Lords 
also declined to find a common law duty of care “for failure to protect the weak against the 
wrongdoer.”4  The case was thereafter submitted to the ECHR, to whose jurisdiction the United 
Kingdom had acquiesced—and to whose decisions it is bound—when it signed and ratified the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(Convention).
5
  The Court found that, contrary to British domestic law, the United Kingdom had 
an international law obligation under the Convention to protection against “torture or . . . 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”6  By failing to protect the five children from 
abuse at the hands of their parents and by failing to provide a domestic remedy, the UK had 
breached its obligation.
7
 
Inherently, the outcome of this case feels just.  Yet were it not for the Convention that 
provided those protections—and which superseded the protections granted by the United 
                                                 
1
 HENRY J. STEINER, PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, 
POLITICS, MORALS 352 (3d ed. 2008). 
2
 Id.; Z and Others v. the United Kingdom 29392/95 [2001] ECHR 333 (10 May 2001), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-59455. 
3
 X (Minors) v. Bedfordshire County Council, [1995] 3 WLR 152 / UKHL 9, page 2, available at 
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1995/9.html. 
4
 Id. at 28. 
5
 Human Rights: The European Convention, BBC NEWS (Sept. 29, 2000), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/948143.stm. 
6
 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 13. 
7
 Z and Others v. the United Kingdom, 29392/95 at ¶ 6975. 
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Kingdom’s own domestic law—the children would have had no legal remedy.  This case serves 
to illustrate well the consequences of the ever-increasing application of international law, and 
specifically human rights law, to domestic constitutional and statutory law. 
National constitutions have always addressed aspects of foreign affairs and international 
law, if by no other means than by delegating to a particular governmental branch the power to 
conclude international treaties.
8
  The last century, however, has seen a growing influence of 
international law on domestic law; one prominent manifestation of this has been the “wave of 
introducing references to international law in national constitutions,” particularly human rights.9  
Refinement of constitutional provisions to reflect international law has made viewing 
international law and “municipal law as almost wholly separate . . . inappropriate in our era.”10  
The traditional interplay between domestic and international law was such that “national 
constitutional principles [were] . . . exported to the international level.”11  The national principle 
of democracy was slowly transferred to the international scene, transformed, and developed into 
the now well-established international notion of self-determination.
12
  Yet now the transpositions 
are exactly opposite—from the international level to the national level. 
This clear evolution of the interaction between international and domestic constitutional 
law has its origins in the two world wars.  After all, “every devastating war [has given] rise to 
hopes, that due compliance with international law, both domestically and internationally, could 
serve as a guarantee against the repetition of the scourge of war.”13  The horrors of World War I 
                                                 
8
 Anne Peters, Supremacy Lost: International Law Meets Domestic Constitutional Law, 3 VIENNA J. INT’L CONST. L. 
170, 171 (2009). 
9
  Vladlen S. Vereshchetin, New Constitutions and the Old Problem of the Relationship between International Law 
and National Law, 7 EUR. J. INT’L L. 29, 29 (1996). 
10
 Peters, supra note 8, at 171; Michael Kirby, International Law—The Impact on National Constitutions, 21 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 327, 329 (2006). 
11
  Peters, supra note 8, at 173. 
12
 Id. 
13
  Vereshchetin, supra note 9, at 30. 
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and World War II gave rise to new developments of international criminal law, humanitarian 
law, and human rights law.  A multitude of international legal instruments were created that dealt 
with the concerns that arose during and following the wars.
14
   
Simultaneously, new constitutions were adopted for Germany, Italy, and Japan, which 
duly reflected these emerging principles.
15
  International human rights particularly played—and 
continue to play—a special role in the “‘penetration’ of international law into domestic legal 
orders and national constitutions.”16  Countries such as Greece, Spain, and Portugal that were 
overcoming totalitarian or authoritarian regimes whose dictators had displayed brutal disregard 
for international obligations and common human values also sought to incorporate universal 
international principles into their constitutions to address past deficiencies.
17
  While the 
incorporation of international law into a constitution does not presuppose immediate compliance, 
it is “a minimum condition for improvements.”18 
The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet bloc opened the floodgates 
to another massive restructuring of domestic constitutions.
19
  Human rights, again, played an 
important part as Central and Eastern European countries sought to give binding force to 
international and human rights law.
20
  Human rights treaties were put on equal footing with other 
constitutionally-provided rights, at times being given primacy over national law.
21
 
                                                 
14
 Id. at 31. 
15
 Id. 
16
  Id. at 3031. 
17
 Id. 
18
 Peters, supra note 8, at 172. 
19
 See id. at 173; see generally Vereshchetin, supra note 9. 
20
 See Peters, supra note 8, at 172. 
21
 Vereshchetin, supra note 9, at 3233.  Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Moldova, and Romania have constitutions 
that make human rights treaties supreme over national law.  Id.  Implicit supremacy can be deduced from provisions 
on the applicability of general international law and international treaties in the constitutions of Armenia, Belarus, 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.  Id. at fn.19.  International treaties 
generally have primacy over national law in Armenia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Tajikistan.  Id. at 
34.  Customary international law, or generally accepted principles and norms, are supreme over national law in 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Belarus.  Id.  (Of the last three countries, the constitutional provisions are unclear 
5 
 
Other developments in international relations would seem to indicate that the 
convergence between international and domestic law is likely to continue.  Various global 
regions have codified their own human rights treaties, and established courts to adjudicate 
violations.
22
  The integration experiment that became the European Union requires new states to 
modify their domestic law to conform to pre-determined standards of human rights and 
international law.
23
  International organizations have sprung up to complement the United 
Nations, and many have their own guidelines for membership.
24
  One of the more important of 
such organizations is the International Criminal Court, established in 2002 to adjudicate the 
worst crimes committed during armed conflict.
25
  Therefore, the internationalization of domestic 
politics
26
 is making inclusion of international law in constitutions a very important and necessary 
strategic choice, especially when it comes to human rights. 
Part II of this paper will briefly describe the traditional methods by which international 
law was incorporated into domestic constitutions.  Part III will highlight the contemporary 
methods by using the fairly recent constitutions of Kosovo and South Africa as models, focusing 
specifically on negative and positive human rights and their interpretation.  Part IV will highlight 
the practical benefits of incorporation of human rights into domestic constitutions by comparing 
the evolution of the British Z case with two very similar cases in the United States. Part V will 
                                                                                                                                                             
and may refer “only or primary to international relations, and aimed at establishing priority of the dictates of general 
international law over political considerations of foreign policy.”). Id. at 35. 
22
 Kirby, supra note 10, at 330.  These include European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (1953), the American Convention on Human Rights (1978), and the African Charger on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (1986).  Richard B. Bilder, An Overview of International Human Rights Law, in GUIDE 
TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 5 (Hurst Hannum ed., 2004). 
23
 See Peters, supra note 8, at 172 fn.7, 173; Vereshchetin, supra note 9, at 31. 
24
 See Vereshchetin, supra note 9, at 31; Peters, supra note 8, at 172 fn.6. 
25
  Peters, supra note 8, at 172 fn.9.  France and Germany, for example, have provisions in their constitutions that 
address jurisdiction of, and surrender of persons to, the International Criminal Court.  Id. at 172. 
26
 Two other factors contribute to this convergence phenomenon.  The first is the “interdependence processes” that 
require the resolution of global problems and further economic integration.  Vereshchetin, supra note 9, at 31.  The 
other is the increase in supervised regime change by Western nations, as evidenced by the experiences of Cambodia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, South Africa, East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo.  Peters, supra note 8, at 173.   
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provide a modern-day context for the creation of constitutions and assess which approaches to 
human rights in domestic law are best.  Part VI will conclude. 
 
II. Traditional Manifestations of International Law in Constitutions 
 
Domestic law and international law are derived from different types of state sovereignty. 
Domestic law is the realm of internal sovereignty, whereby the government exercises absolute 
authority within a confined territory.
27
  International law, or the law of nations, devolves from 
external sovereignty; external sovereignty gives the government the independence to conduct its 
international affairs as it sees fit.
28
  Theorists have sought to answer the question, “Are 
international law and municipal law concomitant aspects of the same juridical reality . . . or are 
they quite distinct normative realities . . . ?”29  In other words, what is the interplay between 
these two types of law—is there overlap, is there a hierarchy?  The debate over the answer to 
these questions has spawned the theories of monism and dualism. 
 
A. Monism 
 
Monism, as its name suggests, holds that domestic law and international law are part of 
the same legal order of sovereignty.
30
  Within that order, there is a hierarchy because of the way 
the laws have developed.  Laws are developed from norms, which give them their meaning and 
make them binding.
31
  Each level of the law depends on the preceding one, making them all 
dependent upon each other.
32
  “From norm to norm, legal analysis eventually reaches one 
                                                 
27
 A.O. Enabuele and C.O. Imoedemhe, Unification of the Application of International Law in the Municipal Realm: 
A Challenge for Contemporary International Law, 12.3 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L. 1, 3 (2008). 
28
 Id. 
29
  J.G. Starke, Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International Law, 17 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 66, 67 (1936). 
30
 Id. (“Two normative systems with binding force in the same field must form part of the same order.”) 
31
 Id. at 74. 
32
 Id. 
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supreme fundamental norm which is the source and foundation of all law.”33  The theory of 
monism holds that that foundation is international law.  The laws governing the domestic and 
international affairs of a state, therefore, are actually unified.
34
   
Within this unitary legal system, international law—as the foundation—has primacy over 
domestic law.
35
  Its primacy derives from the fact that international law is uniquely immune to 
“change or abolition of constitutions or . . . revolutions” and instead applies even-handedly 
“despite alterations in the state normative order.”36  This uniform application requires that 
domestic laws conform to the principles of international law, or states will be in violation.
37
  The 
practical consequences of this are that in national court systems, international law will prevail 
over both international as well as municipal decisions.
38
 
 
B. Dualism 
 
By definition, dualism rests on the premise that domestic law and international law are 
two different spheres of law.
39
  Domestic law regulates the interactions between individuals and 
the government; international law governs relations among states.
40
  In other words, domestic 
law “addresses itself to the subjects of sovereigns, international law to the sovereigns 
themselves.”41  Thus dualism takes the two faces of sovereignty and creates a permanent 
                                                 
33
 Id. at 7475. 
34
 Tom Ginsburg, Svitlana Chernykh & Zachary Elkins, Commitment and Diffusion: How and Why Nat’l 
Constitutions Incorporate International Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 201, 204 (2008). 
35
 Id. 
36
 Starke, supra note 29, at 76. 
37
 Ginsburg et al., supra note 34, at 204. 
38
  Daniel P. O’Connell, The Relationship Between International Law and Municipal Law, 48 GEO. L.J. 431, 432 
(1960). 
39
 Id. at 436. 
40
  Starke, supra note 29, at 70. 
41
  O’Connell, supra note 38, at 436. 
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division.  This division is supposed to ensure that there never be any “point of conflict” that 
arises between them.
42
 
The only application of international law within the domestic context, therefore, should 
come only by affirmative domestic laws.
43
  For the state to have any international obligations, it 
must transpose them into the domestic legal order.
44
  Without such transposition, there would be 
a very real possibility that a state might take an action that under its domestic laws would be 
perfectly legal, but would in reality be a violation of international law.
45
  In such cases, 
proponents of dualism assert that national courts would be required to apply domestic law.
46
  
Thus domestic laws will trump international law in municipal decisions, but international will 
trump domestic law in international decisions.
47
 
  
C. Execution of Treaties 
 
The dichotomy between monism and dualism is best exemplified by the way in which 
international treaties are applied domestically.  A state becomes party to a treaty when its 
representative signs the treaty and the treaty is ratified; ratification is the process by which “a 
State establishes on the international plane its consent to be bound by a treaty,” the method of 
which differs among states, and can usually be found in the constitution.
48
  Upon ratification of a 
treaty, the rules and obligations contained within it may or may not automatically take effect 
domestically—here is where monism and dualism showcase their different approaches.   
A state that approaches treaty law in a monist fashion views treaties as self-executing.  
Since monists believe that international and domestic law are part of the same legal hierarchy, a 
                                                 
42
  Id. 
43
  Ginsburg, supra note 34, at 204. 
44
 Id. 
45
 Id. 
46
  Id. 
47
 O’Connell, supra note 38, at 432. 
48
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 333 (May 23, 1969). 
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self-executing treaty is therefore one that does not require any domestic legislation to become 
internally binding.
49
  Typically, a domestic constitution will authorize the national courts to 
apply international law, signaling that the country views treaty law as self-executing.
50
  The 
result is that “a treaty assumes the force of municipal law the moment it is entered into.”51 
A state that approaches treaty law in a dualist fashion views treaties as non-self-
executing.  A non-self-executing treaty is binding on the state externally—i.e. failure by the state 
to uphold its responsibilities violates international law—but is not binding internally.52  Upon 
signing, a treaty does not have “the force of law in the municipal realm of the state part[y]” 
without further action.
53
  In order for the obligations contained within the treaty to become 
applicable in domestic law, therefore, the legislature must take one of two steps to make it so.  
Either the legislature can pass a law “giving force and life to the application of [the] treaty,” or it 
can independently “incorporate the provisions of the treaty into domestic policy” and then codify 
that policy into law.
54
 
The vast majority of countries take either one approach or the other.  The United States, 
however, takes a hybrid approach; a treaty signed and ratified by the United States may either be 
self-executing or it may be non-self-executing.
55
  This strange result is due to the fact that the US 
Constitution does not contain an explicit provision dictating how international treaties should be 
handled in domestic law.
56
  The consequence is that the courts in the United States “must of 
                                                 
49
 O’Connell, supra note 38, at 451. 
50
 Id. at 452. 
51
 Enabuele and Imoedemhe, supra note 27, at 7.  Countries taking the monist self-execution approach include 
France, Greece, the Netherlands, and Portugal.  Id.  Additionally, the European Union is the “most uniform example 
of self-execution of international law in the municipal realm.”  Id. 
52
  O’Connell, supra note 38, at 451. 
53
 Enabuele and Imoedemhe, supra note 27, at 8.  Countries taking the dualist non-self-execution approach include 
Ireland, Finland, Belgium, Spain, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, and Nigeria.  Id. 
54
 Id.  
55
 Id. 
56
 Id.  
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necessity examine each treaty on its merit and determine whether it is self-executing or not.”57  
Courts look at the language and wording of the treaty to determine the intent behind it and 
whether it is specific enough to be immediately applicable.
58
  United States Supreme Court 
jurisprudence has also developed the principle that wherever possible, domestic laws should be 
interpreted so as not to violate international law.
59
  That principle complements the legal 
standard gleaned from Article VI of the Constitution
60
 that international treaties have the same 
validity as domestic law and therefore that which is most recent prevails.
61
  The haphazardness 
of international law application in US domestic law has led one scholar to quip that “[t]he United 
States regards international law commitments as having the force of law only as it wishes to 
honor them.”62 
Interestingly enough, not all constitutions are consistent in their monist or dualist 
approaches.  Depending on the type of international obligation, states choose either monism or 
dualism; put another way, states either provide for immediate effect of international obligations 
or require legislative action to put them into effect.
63
  The complement of treaty law in the 
international realm is customary international law (CIL).  States that allow for self-execution of 
treaties do not necessarily treat CIL as immediately binding.
64
  On the other hand, some states 
                                                 
57
 Id. at 10. 
58
 Id. 
59
 Enabuele and Imoedeme, supra note 27, at 9; see Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 
(1804). 
60
 U.S. CONST. art. VI, “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any 
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” 
61
  Enabuele and Imoedemhe, supra note 27, at 3. 
62
 Peter Western, The Place of Foreign Treaties in the Courts of the United States: A Reply to Louis Henkin, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 511, 513 (1987). 
63
 Ginsburg et al., supra note 34, at 204. 
64
 Id.  One example is the Dutch Constitution, which puts international treaties above domestic law but not CIL.  Id. 
at 20405. 
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prefer that CIL have primacy over domestic law, but do not accord the same status to treaties.
65
  
Then there are a variety of other approaches within this spectrum.
66
  This seeming inconsistency 
among states’ approaches to their treatment of international law calls into question the usefulness 
of the monism and dualism dichotomy. 
 
D. Legal Pluralism 
 
The theories of monism and dualism have been around for over a hundred years, and for 
the most part, are still leading the discussion on the relationship between international law and 
domestic law.
67
  Yet the world those theories tried to explain no longer exists in any relevant 
form.  Independent nation-states have evolved to become interconnected players in a globalized 
world.
68
  International law has witnessed its own rejuvenation and massive expansion.
69
  The 
emergence of new countries and new constitutions has altered traditional constitution-making 
rules and envisions a role for courts to adjudicate of scope of those very same constitutions.
70
  
And those new constitutions have embraced the incorporation of international law on a vast scale 
and in a variety of brand-new ways.
71
  As a result, “[a]s theories, monism and dualism are today 
unsatisfactory.”72 
A new way of looking at the relationship between international and domestic law is by 
embracing the concept of legal pluralism.  Legal pluralism, far from separating the two legal 
                                                 
65
  Id. at 205.  Germany, Italy, and Austria are three examples.  Id. 
66
 France provides for self-execution of treaties but has no provision for CIL.  Id. Switzerland allows only jus cogens 
to have immediate effect, but no other rules of CIL.  Id.  In the United Kingdom and the United States, CIL has 
traditionally been viewed as part of the common law, and therefore directly applicable.  Id. at 206. 
67
 Armin von Bogdandy, Pluralism, Direct Effect, and the Ultimate Say: On the Relationship Between International 
and Domestic Constitutional Law, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 397, 399 (2008). 
68
 Id. 
69
 Id. at 400. 
70
 Id. 
71
 Id. 
72
 Id.  “Their arguments are rather hermetic, the core assertions are little developed, opposing views are simply 
dismissed as ‘illogical,’ and they are not linked with the contemporary theoretical debate.” 
12 
 
regimes, is founded on the idea that there is constant interaction between international law and 
domestic law.
73
  Given that today, what were historically domestic issues are now frequently 
addressed by international norms as well as domestic norms, the presumption of interaction 
between the two bodies of law is fair and relevant.
74
  It is also very helpful, given that “[t]he 
positioning of a domestic legal order within the wider world necessarily affects fundamental 
issues such as democracy, self-determination, and the self-understanding of the citizenry.”75  
This “positioning” is done on the constitutional level, where states explicitly incorporate 
international norms and rules to varying degrees and in a variety of ways into their founding 
document.  Thus rather than attempt to parse new and modern constitutions to determine which 
provisions are monist and which are dualist—and which theory prevails generally in a 
constitution—it is much more useful to view each such constitution as the product of legal 
pluralism.  That assumption then allows for meaningful analysis and comparison of the different 
ways in which international and human rights law has been constitutionalized.   
 
III. Contemporary and Evolving Manifestations of Human Rights Law 
 
The incorporation of international human rights in domestic constitutions has become 
ubiquitous.  New constitutions in particular are enumerating in their Bills of Rights a wide 
variety of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights.  These rights are a mix of 
negative and positive obligations on governments.  Kosovo and South Africa—two countries 
with among the newest constitutions—provide a good example of the different ways by which 
those types of rights are incorporated.  Each constitution takes a unique approach, one that is in 
considerable part motivated by that country’s history. 
                                                 
73
 Von Bogdandy, supra note 67, at 401. 
74
 Id. 
75
 Id. at 403. 
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A. Negative versus Positive Rights 
 
The arrival of human rights on the international stage was heralded by the adoption of the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948.
76
  In 
one comprehensive document, all human rights—civil, political, social, economic, and cultural—
were “recognized as inseparable and interdependent—indivisible.”77  They were also recognized 
as being an integral aspect of the maintenance of international and domestic peace and security.
78
  
The Declaration was followed in 1966 by two separate treaties that broke apart the human rights 
framework.  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) contained 
negative rights, or what President Franklin Delano Roosevelt had termed “freedom to” rights.79  
Its counterpart, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
contained positive rights, or “freedom from” rights.80  From that moment, the distinction between 
negative and positive rights became prominent in discussions and debates over human rights. 
A negative right is a “right to be free from government.”81  A negative right is a defensive 
right, asserted to prevent the government from interfering with, and trampling on, a person’s 
liberty.
82
  Such a right does not conceive of state responsibility—a state need not implement 
                                                 
76
 Rhonda Copelon, The Indivisible Framework of International Human Rights: A Source of Social Justice in the 
U.S., 3 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 59, 59 (1998). 
77
 Id. 
78
 Id. 
79
 Id. at 60;  Frank Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 858 (2001).These have also been 
called “first-generation rights,” but the United Nations General Assembly (and scholars) has recognized that 
dividing human rights into generations creates a hierarchy that frustrates the “indivisib[ility] and interdependen[ce]” 
of all rights.  Copelon, supra note 76, at 60; Indivisibility and Interdependence of Economic, Social, Cultural, Civil 
and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 41/117, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/117 (Dec. 4, 1986) (The Resolution “reaffirm[s] . . . 
that all human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisibile and interdependent and that the promotion and 
protection of one category of rights can never exempt or excuse States from the promotion and protection of the 
other rights.”  The General Assembly was “[c]onvinced that equal attention and urgent consideration should be 
given to the implementation, promotion and protection of both civil and political rights and economic, social and 
cultural rights.”). 
80
 Copelon, supra note 76, at 60 (these rights have also been called “second-generation rights.”); Cross, supra note 
79, at 858. 
81
 Cross, supra note 79, at 864. 
82 Helen Hershkoff, Foreword: Positive Rights and the Evolution of State Constitutions, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 799, 809 
(2002). 
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measures to protect its citizens from private harm, to enable the enjoyment of liberty, or to guard 
against “purposeful state suppression and discrimination.”83  Given that the foundation of a 
negative right is to prevent governmental meddling, the absence of a government all but ensures 
that those rights are fulfilled.
84
 
By default, then, a positive right is a “right to command government action.”85  A 
positive right is an affirmative right that allows for citizens to demand of their government 
certain “substantive goods or services as an aspect of constitutional duty.”86  In order to provide 
for goods and services, a government is presumptively obliged to actively implement measures 
that will allow for the enjoyment of those goods and services.
87
  Without a government, positive 
rights cannot be fulfilled.
88
 
Negative and positive rights, therefore, create negative and positive obligations on 
government.
89
  It is the interaction between the two that creates the dynamism of international 
human rights law.  The international human rights framework presupposes that the governments 
fulfill some of their obligations immediately (largely negative rights) while working to fulfill 
others (largely positive rights) more gradually and in cooperation with other countries and 
international organizations.
90
  The framework also recognizes that different countries will be in 
different economic and financial positions to implement those rights.  Countries are asked simply 
to endeavor, to the maximum of the resources they have available, to achieve progressive 
realization of those rights.
91
  Thus a country such as the United States, for example, would be 
                                                 
83
 Copelon, supra note 76, at 63. 
84
 Cross, supra note 79, at 866. 
85
 Id. at 864. 
86
 Hershkoff, supra note 82, at 809. 
87
 Cross, supra note 79, at 868. 
88
 Id. 
89
 Copelon, supra note 76, at 64. 
90
 Id.  
91
 Id. 
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expected to be farther along in its fulfillment of human rights than a lesser-developed country.  
Regression, additionally, is forbidden.
92
 
The distinction between negative and positive rights, while seemingly very clear, is 
nevertheless more complex.  The full realization of civil and political rights—generally accepted 
as being negative rights—does rely to a certain extent on the provision of economic and social 
rights.
93
  “Hungry people don’t vote.”94  Their concerns are more basic, and more important.  As 
a result, proper enjoyment of negative rights requires implementation of state measures to ensure 
a standard of living such that a person will engage—standard of living here encompassing every 
aspect related to security of person.  Thus 
[t]he right to be free from torture, for example, requires that states 
institute systemic preventive measures against official 
misconduct—training, monitor, and sanctions . . . Life, liberty, and 
security of person, [as another] example, must be protected against 
privately inflicted harm through investigation, punishment, and 
preventive measures. . . . [T]he right to life entails an obligation to 
prevent and punish political assassination and kidnapping by 
paramilitary operations, as well as murder, gender violence, and 
child abuse by private individuals.
95
 
 
 The responsibility of states is, therefore, multi-faceted.  A constitution enshrining 
negative rights on its face actually contains within it positive obligations to provide for 
conditions that allow for enjoyment of those rights.  Not every country recognizes such 
obligations.  But the underlying theme of both positive and negative human rights is that of 
“accessible and effective judicial remed[ies] for violations.”96  Citizens should have recourse if 
and when their rights are violated.  Unlike in the United States, where justiciability is based on 
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narrow requirements of injury or standing, under international human rights law, injury is given a 
much broader interpretation.
97
  It can encompass everything from true injury, to risk of injury, to 
disadvantages like stigma.
98
  This point about the importance of judicial remedy was illustrated 
in the Z and Others v. United Kingdom case discussed in the introduction.  Nothing in the United 
Kingdom’s law provided a remedy for Z, who had been severely abused.99  The European Court 
of Human Rights found that failure to provide Z with a judicial remedy for the United 
Kingdom’s failure to protect her was an additional violation of her right to be free from inhuman 
and degrading treatment.
100
   
Negative and positive rights, therefore, have a complicated relationship.  The trend in 
international human rights law has been for the incorporation of positive obligations into the 
fulfillment of negative rights, and the recognition that positive rights are a necessary aspect of 
human rights.  Newly-drafted constitutions, such as those of Kosovo and South Africa, reflect 
these trends. 
 
B. Kosovo 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, adopted on June 15, 2008,
101
 contains a 
chapter on “fundamental rights and freedoms,” which in thirty-six articles lays out Kosovo’s 
broad and deep human rights framework.
102
  Of those, Article 22, Articles 23 through 52, and 
Article 53, are worth further discussion.   
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Article 22 is arguably the most novel in the constitution, and potentially even the most 
novel in the history of the art of constitution-drafting.  Entitled “Direct Applicability of 
International Agreements and Instruments,” the article lists eight international human rights 
treaties, the “human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed [therein] . . . are directly 
applicable in the Republic of Kosovo and, in the case of conflict, have priority over provisions of 
laws and other acts of public institutions.”103  Those treaties make up the foundation of 
international human rights law today, and are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its 
Protocols; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Protocols; the Council 
of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities; the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.
104
  As a result of this article, these eight international human rights treaties have 
been “constitutionalized,” meaning that their substantive provisions now have the same rank as 
the constitution.
105
 
Given that these eight treaties contain almost all of the human rights currently 
recognized, there would seem to be no need for an additional enumeration of rights.  
Nevertheless, Articles 23 through 52 explicitly list the human rights which all citizens of Kosovo 
are guaranteed.
106
  Their breadth is quite impressive and they contain a very healthy mix of 
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negative and positive rights.  Additionally, negative rights are given more value as they are 
coupled with positive obligations undertaken by the government of Kosovo.  For example, 
Article 25 protects the right to life.
107
  To further the enjoyment of that right, the same article 
affirmatively forbids the practice of capital punishment.
108
  Article 113 gives emphasis to these 
provisions, as it allows for individual citizens to file a complaint with the Kosovo Constitutional 
Court regarding violations by the government of “their individual rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the Constitution.”109   
In addition, Article 53 requires that when the human rights enumerated in the chapter are 
interpreted by the courts, the courts must interpret those rights “consistent with the court 
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights [ECHR].”110  This provision is interesting in 
that it seems contrary to the constitutional “rank” that the European Convention on the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, listed in Article 22, enjoys.
111
  Article 22 provides 
for the rights contained within the Convention to assume the same status as any of the other 
rights explicitly listed in the Constitution; however, by requiring that all interpretations of human 
rights be in line with the jurisprudence of the ECHR, that in essence places the rights of the 
Convention above the rights in the Constitution.  The Kosovo Constitution is still young but it 
will be interesting to see this dynamic play out; it may indeed be a flaw.
112
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i. Historical Context 
“Every constitutional text must be seen in light of its historical and political context, 
since such provisions frequently have the character of being a ‘response’ to political and legal 
problems of the past.”113  The enclave of Kosovo used to be an autonomous region in Serbia, 
which itself was a part of Yugoslavia.  Animosities, however, between the majority Albanian 
Kosovars, and minority Serbian Kosovars, were rife.
114
  Following war between Serbia and 
Kosovo in 199899, during which NATO had to intervene militarily, the region of Kosovo was 
placed under the administration of the United Nations (UN).
115
  The UN adopted a “standards 
before status” approach as its governing strategy, focusing on rebuilding and reconciling before 
attempting to determine if and when Kosovo should become an independent country.
116
  
Nevertheless, Kosovo’s independence was contingent on compliance with international human 
rights—the various proposals and plans for Kosovo contained “firm guarantees of the human 
rights dimension.”117  The international governance by the UN had also begun to engrain in 
Kosovo a culture of incorporating international principles and standards, including human 
rights.
118
 
When a committee was created to draft a constitution, following Kosovo’s unilateral 
declaration of independence on February 17, 2008, not only was it heavily influenced by 
international sources, but it also had to achieve three internationally-oriented goals.  First, the 
constitution had to be deemed legitimate by the Kosovo people, who could begin to feel a sense 
of ownership of it, while at the same time being “acceptable and impressive” to the rest of the 
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world.
119
  Second, it had to underpin a broad global acceptance of the independence of Kosovo 
and Kosovo’s quick legal recognition, especially considering the anticipated, and actual, 
resistance from Russia and Serbia.
120
  Third, it had to lay the foundation for eventual accession 
of Kosovo into the European Union.
121
 
In order to achieve those goals, then, the constitution had to cement a firm adherence to 
international human rights.  Decades of ethnic violence and animosity, and the widely-held view 
that national minorities would not be protected by the new government, needed to be 
addressed.
122
  The constitution thus contains a very strong framework of protection for ethnic 
minorities while sustaining the overall multiethnicity of the country.
123
  As a result, many of the 
human rights enumerated and strong minority protections provided for were as much a strategic 
political choice as they were an altruistic one. 
The inclusion of Article 22 constitutionalizing the eight human rights treaties provides a 
case in point.  During the administration of Kosovo by the UN, the UN Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) passed a regulation that almost exactly paralleled Article 22.
124
  It provided for 
Kosovo’s adherence to the obligations contained in the self-same human rights treaties that are 
now found in Kosovo’s constitution, save one.125  Kosovo, having not yet declared 
independence, could not ratify those treaties and therefore the UNMIK regulation was the only 
way by which Kosovo could be bound by them.  This same international law principle was—and 
still is—applicable at the time of the drafting of the constitution.  Kosovo’s independence has not 
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been universally recognized and it therefore does not have the legal capacity to accede to these 
treaties.
126
  Kosovo, therefore, cannot become a party to those treaties and the obligations are not 
binding.  By constitutionalizing the treaties, however, Kosovo confirmed that it would consider 
itself bound by the human rights protected therein.
127
  
 
C. South Africa 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa came into force on February 4, 1997.
128
  
Within it, Chapter 2 is entitled Bill of Rights and includes thirty-three individual articles.
129
  
Several articles in this chapter bear further discussion, specifically Articles 9 through 35, and 
Article 39. 
Articles 9 through 35 contain the specific human rights, liberties, and freedoms that 
South Africa sought to enshrine in the Bill of Rights.
130
  These rights are extraordinarily 
progressive—they contain not only civil and political rights, but also numerous social, economic, 
and cultural rights.  As a result, the Bill of Rights imposes on the South African government both 
negative and positive responsibilities.  Interestingly, the articles enumerating negative rights do 
not contain explicit positive obligations for their fulfillment.  The language laying out the rights 
to life, expression, assembly, and association, for example, is very straightforward—“everyone 
has the right to life.”131   
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The articles specifying the positive rights—the socioeconomic rights—are, on the other 
hand, very explicit about the role of the government in their implementation.  Article 26 provides 
“the right to have access to adequate housing,” requiring that the “state . . . take reasonable 
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive 
realisation of this right.”132  That language is repeated for the rights to health care, food, water 
and social security.
133
  Articles 32 and 33, pertaining to the right of access to information and the 
“right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable, and procedurally fair,” respectively, 
state that “[n]ational legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights.”134  South Africa 
has heartily embraced the concepts of progressive realization of rights based on resource 
capability. 
Justiciability, or the judicial enforcement, of socioeconomic rights is rare.  South Africa, 
however, does not shy from imposing responsibilities on the state to ensure the enjoyment of 
these rights and provides for their enforcement in Article 38.  That article allows for a very broad 
interpretation of standing, giving persons the right to “approach a competent court, alleging that 
a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened,” to those who are acting on their 
own behalf; acting on behalf of someone who is unable to act; acting as a member of a group; 
acting in the public interest; or an organization acting on behalf of its members.
135
  The generous 
nature of this provision is made even more so by the fact that the language in the constitution 
permits the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights to be applied both vertically and 
horizontally.
136
  Article 8(2) states that “[a] provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a 
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juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right 
and the nature of any duty imposed by the right.”137  That means that not only do all the rights in 
the Bill of Rights bind the state with regard to its citizens,
138
  but under certain circumstances, 
some rights may also bind private institutions and actors with regard to civilians.
139
  
Article 39 provides clear instructions for judges on how to interpret the Bill of Rights.
140
  
First, courts “must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom.”141  Second, courts “must consider international law.”142  
Third, courts “may consider foreign law.”143  Of those three guidelines, the second is the most 
interesting and has been interpreted by the South African Constitutional Court very broadly.
144
  
International law can thus be both binding and non-binding, take the form of an international 
agreement or customary international law, decisions of international tribunals such as the United 
Nations Committee on Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the 
European Commission on Human Rights, and the European Court of Human Rights, and may 
also include “reports of specialised agencies such as the International Labour Organisation.”145 
 
ii. Historical Context 
As with Kosovo, the unique nature of the South African Constitution requires some 
historical context in order to be better understood.  Following the end of World War II, the 
Afrikaner white minority in South Africa tightened its grip on power by institutionalizing the 
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apartheid system of strict repression and massive discrimination against the black African 
majority.
146
  The valuable “multiethnic, multilingual, and multicultural nature of South African 
society” was cast aside.147  Forty years of apartheid followed, with South Africa increasingly 
becoming a pariah in the international community and a delinquent within the international 
human rights framework.
148
  As international human rights developed, apartheid became a crime 
as it was contrary to the United Nations Charter principles of non-discrimination and self-
determination.
149
   
Within South Africa, the white National Party had banned the African National Congress 
and imprisoned its leader, Nelson Mandela.
150
  The thawing and ultimate collapse of the Cold 
War in the late 1980s began to thaw the apartheid system and Mandela was released in 1990.
151
  
The first attempt at a new constitution revealed thirty-four constitutional principles with which 
the final constitution would have to comply.
152
  Compliance with those principles was to be 
determined by the newly-created South African Constitutional Court.
153
  The Bill of Rights was 
the fulfillment of the second principle, namely that “everyone shall enjoy all universally accepted 
fundamental rights, freedoms and liberties.”154 
That principle was the manifestation of the struggle “to confront how to permit the 
creation of democratic political structures, and the inevitable emergence of black majority rule, 
while allaying the fears of the white minority that this ‘democracy’ would simply be code for 
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racial revanchism.”155  For unlike in most countries drafting new constitutions—after 
independence—the black South Africans needed to construct a society and a government that 
would allow them to “coexist on equal terms with their past oppressors.”156  The constitution had 
to be created in a credible and transparent way to make it fair, inclusive, legitimate, accessible, 
and durable.
157
  The result was the 1996 Constitution and the Bill of Rights.  The release of black 
South Africans from oppression had resulted in a clamor for recognition of social interests and 
identities, which lead to the incorporation of numerous socioeconomic rights into the Bill of 
Rights.
158
  Distrust between the National Party and the African National Congress led to the 
placement of broad judicial review with the independent judiciary, rather than with the 
legislature.
159
 
South Africa’s history of flaunting international law and international human rights law 
particularly underpinned the inclusion of Article 39, requiring courts to consider international 
law.  The provision would allow for harmony between South African jurisprudence and the 
jurisprudential development of international human rights.
160
  Another motivating factor was that 
international law is beyond the control of South Africa’s legislature—requiring the courts to look 
to international law “constrain[s] majoritarian prerogatives by providing an independent, non-
parliamentary source of authority for courts to enforce.”161 
Incorporation of progressive and expansive international human rights protections into 
the constitutions of Kosovo and South Africa speaks to the increasing importance of human 
rights among the international community and human rights’ increasing relevance in addressing 
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domestic issues.  The unique socio-political histories of Kosovo and South Africa in turn 
influenced the manner and method by which human rights were enshrined in the respective 
constitutions.  Kosovo chose to place great emphasis on international human rights treaties and 
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, both due to its ambiguous legal status 
and because of its future goal of joining the European Union.  South Africa chose to favor social 
and economic rights and to swear adherence to international law because of its oppressive past 
and international ostracism. Ultimately, however, both countries recognized the importance and 
necessity of international human rights and the power of negative and positive rights. 
 
IV. The Interplay of the Traditional and the Contemporary in the United States 
 
Analysis of a constitution that includes robust negative and positive rights, and the 
process by which it was drafted, is by necessity a theoretical one.  The constitutions of South 
Africa and Kosovo provide numerous rights which each country’s judiciary is in the process of 
defining and applying.  In order to truly highlight the very practical benefits that are created by 
the incorporation of both negative and positive human rights into a domestic constitution, 
however, this paper will look at human rights jurisprudence from the United States.  The United 
States has an entirely negative constitution and the Supreme Court is reluctant to reference 
international human rights law in its decisions.  As a result, progressive developments in the law 
and jurisprudence of human rights have no impact on US cases, to the detriment of those alleging 
serious violations of human rights.  
 
A. The Tragedies of DeShaney and Castle Rock 
The case of Z and Others v. the United Kingdom, discussed in the introduction, had a 
happy ending because the United Kingdom, which did not recognize a positive duty to protect 
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under domestic law, was subject to the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms.
162
  The European Court of Human Rights found that by failing to 
protect Z from the inhumane treatment she was subjected to, and by failing to provide a judicial 
remedy, the United Kingdom was in violation and was required to pay damages and change its 
laws to conform to the Convention.
163
   
A very similar situation was brought to the attention of the United States Supreme Court 
in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services.
164
  Little Joshua DeShaney 
was in the custody of his father after his parents divorced.
165
  Over a course of several months, he 
was admitted into hospital with numerous injuries, bruises, and abrasions; a Department of 
Social Services (DSS) caseworker reported seeing other injuries, including ones to the head, 
when she visited his house.
166
  Nobody took any measures to protect Joshua.  One day, his father 
beat him so badly that Joshua “fell into a life-threatening coma.”167  Medical scans revealed 
massive brain hemorrhages from repeated injuries to the head.
168
  Joshua’s mother brought suit 
for violation of Joshua’s federal constitutional right to liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment 
because the DSS had failed to protect him even though they knew or should have known he was 
in danger.
169
 
Traveling through the federal court system, the case made it to the Supreme Court.  
Despite the “undeniably tragic” circumstances, the Court found that the Fourteenth Amendment 
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does not provide for government protection of “citizens against invasion by private actors.”170  
DSS could not be held liable for failing to remove Joshua from his father because his father was 
a private actor.  The interaction between DSS and the family, additionally, did not create a 
“special relationship” under which DSS had the duty to protect him, because special 
relationships are only created in a few narrow circumstances.
171
  No reference was made to 
international law.
172
  As a result, Joshua, who did not die but instead suffered permanent and 
severe brain damage,
173
 and his mother were denied any remedy.  
A case with even more horrifying facts came before the Supreme Court fifteen years after 
DeShaney.  Castle Rock v. Gonzales
174
 involved a mother, Jessica, who had obtained a 
restraining order for her and her three young daughters against her husband whom she was 
divorcing.
175
  A month later, her husband abducted the daughters while they were playing in their 
front yard.
176
  Jessica rushed to the police to have them enforce the restraining order, but they 
refused and did nothing.
177
  Early the next morning, the husband showed up at the police station 
and opened fire; the police fired back and killed him.
178
  The bodies of the three daughters, 
riddled with bullets, were discovered in the back of his pickup truck.
179
 
Jessica’s Fourteenth Amendment violation claim rested on the argument that she had a 
property interest in her restraining order that she had been deprived of without due process.
180
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This was a question that the Supreme Court had explicitly left unresolved in DeShaney.
181
  
Answering it, the Court said that enforcement of “apparently mandatory” arrest provisions of 
restraining orders actually has a “well established tradition of police discretion.”182  Police 
officers thus may, but are not required to, arrest the person who is in violation of the restraining 
order.  Any benefit of protection that a third party might get from such an arrest “generally does 
not trigger . . . the Due Process Clause.”183  Nowhere in the opinion was there a discussion of 
protections that international human rights law could have afforded.
184
  Jessica thereby received 
no remedy for the lackluster behavior of the police, given that the Fourteenth Amendment cannot 
be used as an incentive for vigorous policing.
185
 
 
B. Negative Nature of the United States Constitution 
The United States is historically very strongly opposed to positive rights, as evidenced by 
the nature of the Constitution as “a charter of negative rather than positive liberties.”186  Given 
the history of the American colonies, subjected to repeated interference from the British Crown, 
the Framers of the Constitution were duly concerned with the protection of rights against 
government.
187
  Accordingly, the Constitution and specifically the Bill of Rights contain 
“prohibitory constraints” on government action, and not affirmative duties requiring compliance 
by the government.
188
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The almost exclusive focus on negative rights—and their interpretation by the United 
States Supreme Court—has resulted in the inability of citizens to put forward both “narrow 
claims that particular government officials violated specific duties to known individuals” and 
“broad claims that government must provide food to the starving, jobs to the unemployed.”189  
Any desire by the government to provide services is therefore discretionary; and even if the 
government does so choose, those services do not have to be provided competently.
190
   
This is not to say that the negative rights in the Bill of Rights and the Constitution cannot 
be interpreted to contain some positive obligations.
191
  Nothing in the Constitution prevents such 
an interpretation and it would be equally as “plausible and legitimate as a strict negative rights 
view.”192  Indeed, the international human rights framework contemplates that governments take 
positive steps to ensure the proper and full enjoyment of negative rights.
193
  Prior to the 
DeShaney case, state and federal district courts were not averse to articulating doctrines that 
imposed some positive obligations on the government.
194
  Since DeShaney, however, judges 
have repudiated those doctrines and instead have “dismissed any claim that citizens have any 
positive rights to government services.”195  The federal government no longer has, if it ever truly 
had, affirmative duties to actively ensure citizens’ enjoyment of their constitutional rights.196 
This harsh approach—not necessarily harsh on its face but certainly harsh in its 
consequences—may have a parallel in the interpretive approach taken by the United Kingdom.  
The international human rights framework, however, forced the United Kingdom to modify its 
position.  Whether or not it can force the United States to do the same is open for discussion. 
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C. Castle Rock Internationally 
Domestically, the result of DeShaney and Castle Rock are the same: there is no remedy 
for a failure of a government body—whether Department of Social Services or police—to 
prevent a crime it is not statutorily mandated to prevent.  Unlike Joshua DeShaney’s mother, 
however, Jessica Gonzales took her case before a new tribunal, the Inter-American Commission 
of Human Rights (IACHR or Commission).  The IACHR is one counterpart in the Western 
hemisphere of the European Court of Human Rights, to which the case of Z was submitted.
197
  
The United States is subject to the jurisdiction of the IACHR as a member of the Organization of 
American States, as it is bound by the international obligations laid out in the American 
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man.
198
  The other counterpart to the European Court is 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which adjudicates violations of the American 
Convention on Human Rights, as well as violations of the American Declaration.
199
  The United 
States is not party to the Convention, and therefore cannot be brought before the Court.
200
 
The violations alleged in Gonzales v. United States
201
 were radically different from those 
alleged in Gonzales v. Castle Rock, as they were based on international human rights that are not 
affirmatively embedded in the United States Constitution in any form.  The circumstances of the 
case—not just the facts of the abduction and murder of the girls, but the decisions of the 
American courts, as well—implicated potential violations of a number of these human rights.  
The petition alleged violations of the right to life, liberty, and security; equality before the law; 
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protection of honor, personal reputation, and private and family life; family and protection 
thereof; protection for mothers and children; inviolability of the home; fair trial; and petition.
202
  
The United States, in its response, reiterated the holding of the DeShaney case, stating that the 
American Declaration does not impose an affirmative duty on the United States “to prevent the 
commission of individual crimes by private actors.”203 
The IACHR did not agree.  Addressing the violations alleged under the rights to life, 
liberty, security, equality, and protections for the mother and children, the Commission declared 
that states must take positive measures, including policy and laws, to guarantee the enjoyment of 
the rights contained in the Declaration.
204
  It drew the connection between the vulnerability of 
women and children, saying that “protection of life is a critical component of a State’s due 
diligence obligation to protect women from acts of violence.”205  The failure of the United States 
to fulfill its due diligence duty meant that it failed to protect Jessica’s daughters from the 
violence, violating their rights to life and equality.
206
 
The IACHR also discussed the effectiveness of the judicial remedies available to Jessica, 
and found them wanting.  Due diligence in providing remedies does not simply mean that such 
remedies exist, but that they are “available and effective.”207  Incorporated within the scope of 
judicial protection is the right to access of information and truth, which corresponds to a duty by 
the state to fully investigate a case.
208
  That investigation must be “impartial, serious and 
exhaustive” and must be conducted according to international standards.209  The failure of the 
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Castle Rock Police Department to investigate fully the deaths of Jessica’s three daughters was 
therefore a violation of their and their mother’s right to judicial protection.210 
The Commission found the United States in violation of Jessica and her daughters’ rights 
to life, liberty, and security, right to equality under the law, right of protection for mothers and 
children, and right to judicial protection.  It issued, as part of its decision, a series of 
recommendations of actions that the United States take to come into compliance with the 
American Declaration.
211
  The United States had two months to respond to the recommendations 
and submit a report detailing the actions it took to bring them about.
212
  The US did not respond, 
not even after an extension, so the IACHR concluded that the United States had not implemented 
any measures and was therefore in violation.
213
  The IACHR decision is undoubtedly a 
vindication for Jessica Gonzales, but as the United States’ response—or lack thereof—to the 
recommendations demonstrates, the domestic implications of the decision are less clear.   
As discussed above,
214
 the United States takes a hybrid approach toward execution of 
treaties.  This has very important consequences for the future of the Gonzales case.  Unlike the 
United Kingdom, the United States has not signed any treaty that makes the law created by the 
IACHR superior to domestic law and therefore binding.
215
  It is treated like a regular treaty in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
to identify the victim; to recover and analyze all the material and documentary evidence; to 
identify possible witnesses and collect their testimony; to determine the cause, manner and time of 
death, as well as the procedure, practice, or instruments which may have caused the death; to 
distinguish between natural death, accidental death, suicide, and homicide; and to identify and 
apprehend the person or persons who may have participated in the execution. 
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sense that it is an obligation undertaken by the United States under international law.
216
  But as 
the Supreme Court has made very clear, not all international law obligations become 
domestically-enforceable obligations—they themselves are not binding domestic law.217  They 
only become binding once Congress has passed enacting legislation or has independently 
incorporated those obligations into national law.
218
  Since the obligations are not domestic law, 
the United States is not bound to follow them; as a result, the United States, by failing to 
implement the recommendations, is in violation of international law, but not in violation of 
domestic law.  Thus the ending to Jessica’s story is less happy than the ending of the story of Z 
and her siblings and family. 
 
V. Choosing the Proper Approach 
 
The world went through a fit of constitution-making in the early and mid-1990s with the 
end of the Cold War and emancipation of much of Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans.  
The need for constitutions then slowed.  New constitutions were created for East Timor and 
Kosovo in the early 2000s by the administration of the United Nations.
219
  South Sudan created 
its new constitution in 2011.
220
  The Arab Spring that began in 2011 has sparked a need for yet 
another handful of new constitutions for the Middle East and North Africa.
221
  Thus while there 
are fewer and fewer new states being created, old states are undergoing powerful revolutions that 
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will also necessitate a complete reevaluation of their current constitutional structure.  In addition, 
there are always secessionist movements around that world that will seek to take advantage of 
favorable international conditions to try to declare independence.
222
   
 The continually increasing importance of international law, particularly human rights 
law, and the now-common practice of incorporation of human rights into domestic constitutions, 
will undoubtedly play a prominent role in the process of crafting future new constitutions.  It is 
undeniable that despite the number of constitutions that incorporate international human rights, 
there is no uniformity in wording and implementation.
223
  While that may to some respect be 
detrimental, it is actually very beneficial because it allows countries to specifically tailor their 
human rights provisions to their particular socio-political histories.  Those countries will also 
have the benefit of being able to survey a handful of constitutions that can provide different 
models for incorporation of human rights.  This section will outline some recommendations on 
how to integrate human rights into new countries’ domestic constitutions. 
 
A. Enumeration of Human Rights 
 
The inclusion of a Bill of Rights in a new constitution—or a chapter on fundamental 
freedoms and rights—has by now become almost mandatory.  In its rendition, Kosovo 
constitutionalized eight human rights treaties, enumerated many negative and some positive 
rights, and provided for its court to interpret human rights based on the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights.
224
  South Africa’s rendition included negative rights and 
numerous positive rights with strong governmental obligations and required that its court 
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consider international law in interpreting human rights provisions.
225
  Ideally, a new constitution 
created today would display the best of both of these models. 
Such a modern constitution would contain both negative and positive human rights.  The 
negative rights need or need not explicitly provide for actions to be taken by the state for the 
rights’ proper fulfillment, but courts should interpret that as inherent.  Positive rights should 
include socioeconomic and cultural rights, as that is the future of international human rights law.  
Countries should embrace—or become reconciled with—the fact that progressive realization of 
positive rights, based upon a country’s availability of resources, is the only way to ensure the full 
enjoyment of all rights, negative and positive. 
Given the rapid development of international human rights over the past half-century, 
there should be some provision to allow for the constitutionalization of rights that may still be 
controversial, but the universal recognition of which may not be far away.  Kosovo does not 
make its human rights list non-exhaustive; the rights enumerated in that list are the only rights 
protected under the constitution.  South Africa does not expressly provide for recognition of 
additional international human rights, rather the constitution “does not deny the existence of any 
other rights or freedoms that are recognised or conferred by common law, customary law or 
legislation, to the extent that they are consistent with the Bill.”226  Other constitutions, however, 
have included a much more explicit ‘catch-all’ provision.227  In essence, such a provision would 
state that grants of new human rights codified in international human rights treaties signed and 
ratified by a particular country be accorded primacy over national law to the extent that they 
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provide for more freedom and greater rights.
228
  That way, citizens will be able to appeal to the 
courts on the basis of human rights treaties to create new rights not contained in their 
constitutions. 
Kosovo’s quirky and potentially unwieldy provision constitutionalizing human rights 
treaties is not recommended for most countries.  The motivation behind that provision was to 
bind Kosovo to treaties it is not yet allowed to accede to due to its controversial legal status in 
international law.  Countries undergoing revolutions during the Arab Spring do not have 
controversial legal statuses—they have long been recognized as countries.  Thus such a provision 
would be useless.  However, it would not do to rule out the possibility of another Kosovo-like 
situation occurring, with disputes among the international community about a new country’s 
legal status.  Should that be the case, and should that country wish to demonstrate its 
commitment to international law and human rights, it may be well-advised to rank human rights 
treaties equal with other constitutional articles. 
 
B. The Importance of a Worldly Court 
 
Of the constitutions created over the past two decades, those of Kosovo and South Africa 
seem to be two of very few that require that courts rely on some form of international law as a 
basis for interpreting human rights.
229
  Kosovo binds its courts to the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights while South African requires that the courts consider 
international law broadly.   
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The requirement of at least contemplating the current state of international law on a 
particular topic certainly has its virtues.  It allows the court to see where, within the spectrum of 
international law, its decision might fall.  The development of international human rights law 
being particularly dynamic, such a requirement also seeks to prevent a country from 
implementing a human rights framework that is out of touch with the rest of the world.  That is 
why it is more useful to have a provision that enables courts to look beyond simply the 
jurisprudence of one international tribunal, such as the European Court of Human Rights.  The 
European Court is currently at the forefront of human rights law, but it is not the only human 
rights court in the world.  Nothing in the Kosovo Constitution prevents the court from looking at 
other treaties and jurisprudence, of course.  But strict adherence overlooks the fact that 
development of international human rights is a global venture. 
In that respect, it can also be a fruitful exercise for courts to be able to consider laws of 
other countries.  South Africa makes consideration of foreign law discretionary.  That should be 
the proper approach.  Considering the diverse legislation around the world, even on a singular 
topic, making use of foreign law mandatory would frustrate court resources and allow a court to 
cherry-pick which countries supported whatever position it wished to take.  But allowing for 
consideration of foreign law, and foreign jurisprudence, could be a useful tool for courts to use, 
especially in determining the scope of a controversial new human right. 
 
i. Use (or Lack Thereof) of International Law by the United States Supreme 
Court 
 
The preceding discussion about the use of international and foreign law by domestic 
courts to interpret human rights presupposes that such an exercise is a good idea.  It also rejects 
the idea of an “originalist” approach to constitutions, meaning that constitutions are exclusively 
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interpreted based on “the historical public meaning of words and phrases” they contain.230  This 
approach is contrasted with the approach of the “living constitution,” where its provisions are 
interpreted according to the contemporary situation.
231
  In the United States Supreme Court, 
Justice Antonin Scalia purports to be the defender of originalism, stating that “comparative 
[international and foreign] analysis [is] inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution,” 
even as he acknowledges that “of course [it was] quite relevant to the task of writing one.”232 
That statement not only seems illogical but is also contrary to the Supreme Court’s 
history of referencing international law.
233
  The lawyers of the 1800s viewed international law as 
derived from natural law, and used it to support arguments on how to interpret the 
Constitution.
234
  As international law evolved, so too did its use in domestic courts’ opinions 
about constitutional provisions.
235
   
More recently, international and foreign law has been used in one of three ways by the 
justices of the Supreme Court.  The first is that international law is referenced only to provide 
“facts about the state of the law outside the United States.”236  The international law mentioned 
in Atkins v. Virginia, Grutter v. Bollinger, and arguably in Lawrence v. Texas was not used to 
support the justices’ conclusion about the scope of the US Constitution, only to provide global 
context.
237
  The second type of reference is that which indicates true disagreement among 
                                                 
230
 Gerald L. Neuman, International Law as a Resource in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 177, 180 (2006). 
231
 Id. 
232
 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997). 
233
 For a more detailed account, see Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 
(2006). 
234
 Neuman, supra note 230, at 181. 
235
 Id. “Jurisprudential assumptions of international law have themselves evolved, first through the ascendance of 
positivism in the nineteenth century, and then through the tempering of positivism by the human rights paradigm in 
the late twentieth century.” 
236
 Mark V. Tushnet, Referring to Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation: An Episode in the Culture Wars, 35 
U. BALT. L. REV. 299, 304 (2006). 
237
 Id.  “Moreover, within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by 
mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.”  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002).  
40 
 
justices about the method of interpreting a constitutional provision.  Printz v. United States is the 
best example.
238
  In his dissent, Justice Breyer compares the federal system in the United States 
to that found in Switzerland, Germany, and the European Union.
239
  It is this discussion that 
prompted Justice Scalia to say that international law has no place in interpreting the Constitution. 
The third, and most controversial, reference to international law—and that which has 
sparked the greatest controversy—is its substantial use in a Supreme Court decision to support an 
outcome.  In Roper v. Simmons,
240
 the majority opinion written by Justice Kennedy contained a 
separate section on international and foreign law pertaining to the execution of juveniles.
241
  That 
section discusses the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and conducts a 
survey of countries’ laws to determine that the United States is an outlier in allowing the death 
penalty for juveniles.
242
  Despite Justice Scalia’s excoriation that “[t]o invoke alien law when it 
agrees with one’s own thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decisionmaking, but 
sophistry,”243 Justice Kennedy prefaced and concluded the international law section by stating 
that “[t]he opinion of the world community . . . [does] not control[] our outcome.”244 
On the contrary, Justice Kennedy was quite right to assert that “respected and significant” 
corroboration from the international community can help to confirm the court’s own 
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conclusions.
245
  “It does not lessen [the Supreme Court’s] fidelity to the Constitution or [its] 
pride in its origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by 
other nations and peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own 
heritage of freedom.”246  International and foreign law does not, and cannot, control the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the Constitution.247  It can, however, provide a useful evaluation of the 
“factual realit[ies]” of the world as well as “normative standards” that can help to guide judges 
and justices in making their decisions.
248
  As a result, just as original intent is but one factor that 
is to be used in interpreting a constitution, so is international and foreign law.  A constitution, 
particularly the United States Constitution, consists of broad principles that may sometimes be in 
conflict; the norms of international law may help to solve that conflict.
249
   
This is especially the case with human rights.  International human rights law does not 
require that states constitutionalize its protections as the method of domestic implementation.
250
  
Neither does it require that states that have stronger and broader protections reduce the scope of 
their human rights to the international level.
251
  What the international human rights regime does 
do is “challenge[] states to reexamine the justifiability of their local practices.  When 
international human rights protections exceed traditional . . . interpretations of the same right, 
[domestic courts] may properly consider whether [their] own doctrinal formulations afford 
insufficient respect to some aspect of that right.”252  Thus careful and intelligent application and 
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consideration of international law—in particular human rights law—gives countries the ability 
“to interact with other nations and international institutions” on an equal plane.253 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
International human rights law occupies an important role on both the international scene 
and the domestic scene.  In response, countries faced with the challenge of overcoming troubled 
histories have turned to the incorporation of human rights into their new constitutions as a clear 
manifestation of their intent to abide by international law.  The methods of incorporation are as 
numerous as the countries that have employed them.  Far from being a disadvantage, this lack of 
uniformity allows countries to uniquely shape their approach to best respond to their situation.  
Different circumstances notwithstanding, each future constitution should include a Bill of Rights 
containing negative and positive human rights, with explicit or implicit provisions for positive 
obligations on the government to provide for the full enjoyment of the rights.  Domestic courts 
should be required to access international law, and allowed to reference foreign law at their 
discretion, to provide guidance on how to interpret constitutional human rights provisions. 
The benefits of incorporation of negative as well as positive human rights in domestic 
constitutions becomes readily apparent when considered in the light of the United States’ 
rejection of any positive obligations on the government.  The cases of Joshua DeShaney and 
Jessica Gonzales’ daughters demonstrate that while positive obligations on the government may 
be onerous and expensive, they can also be literally life-saving.  The heart-wrenching situations 
may have been prevented—or at least some judicial remedy could have been provided for the 
surviving victims—had the United States incorporated, through legislation, the rights found in 
the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man.  It could have ratified the American 
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Convention on Human Rights and incorporated those provisions into statutory law.  It could have 
amended the Constitution to require that judges take international law into consideration when 
adjudicating cases or that judges take notice of the jurisprudence of international human rights 
tribunals.  Most of these suggestions are admittedly fanciful, but they serve to illustrate the 
variety of ways in which the United States, and other countries, can bring their human rights 
jurisprudence in line with the international human rights jurisprudence. 
Incorporation of human rights into constitutions is not therefore simply a writing 
exercise.  Failure to do so has very real consequences that seem inherently unfair and are 
realistically avoidable.  Newly-created countries and old countries with newly-awoken societies 
have the distinct advantage of decades of constitution-making they can study and from which 
they can benefit.  Recent history has shown that they will and that their citizens will be grateful. 
 
 
